

<https://helda.helsinki.fi>

Character Virtues and Forms of Government : Plato and Aristotle

Kaila, Eero Aleksis

Ionia Publications
2018

Kaila , E A 2018 , Character Virtues and Forms of Government : Plato and Aristotle . in K Boudouris & K Dimitracopoulos (eds) , The World Congress of Philosophy: The Philosophy of Aristotle . vol. 3 , Ionia Publications , pp. 114-123 , World Congress of Philosophy - WCP 2016 , Greece , 10/07/2016 .

<http://hdl.handle.net/10138/311891>

unspecified
acceptedVersion

Downloaded from Helda, University of Helsinki institutional repository.

This is an electronic reprint of the original article.

This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.

Please cite the original version.

Character Virtues and Forms of Government: Plato and Aristotle¹

Eero Kaila

University of Helsinki

Abstract

In this presentation Plato's and Aristotle's theories are compared with each other, on whether the character virtues have an effect on the formation of government in the state (*polis*). In the *Republic* Plato contrasts the virtues of the individual – wisdom, courage and temperance – with the classes in society: guardians, soldiers and producers (see 370-375). The virtues repeat within the structure of the state (see 435e); e.g. the more courageous the soldiers are, the more successful the state is in its campaigns. Additionally as the balance of the cardinal virtues, justice has a central role in the *Republic*. On the political level justice is realized in the way that the citizens find positions that are the best fit for their virtues (435b). An example of such case would be one, where the rulers are the wisest and the most courageous individuals would be able to be employed as soldiers, and so on.

The character of the ruler determines (through the making of laws among other ways) the form of the government (see 338e-339e). Plato gives examples of five different types of rulers, whose defining characteristics are: just (484ad), belligerent and ambitious (545a, 548a-550b), avaricious (555a-b), self-serving and lazy (561a-d) and, as the worst option, an animal-like madness (571b-d, 573dc-574a). The forms of government representing rulers driven by these characteristics are: aristocracy (445c-e, 497ab), timocracy (545a-548a), oligarchy (550d-e), democracy and tyranny (see IX). The government by the so-called "philosopher-king" or aristocracy is Plato's ideal form of government, from where the other forms of government degenerate from (see 546d-547c & 572c-573c).

Taking into consideration the death penalty of Socrates, it is easy to understand why Plato held democracy in as low position in the hierarchy of the forms of government. His student, Aristotle, might have asked him: "Is it really so, that any oligarchy is better than any democracy, just on grounds that a democratic ruler is self-serving and lazy by definition?"

Aristotle's theory includes a more complex examination of the interaction between the virtues and the state, than what Plato's theory does. This is achieved among other things through the separation of the character virtues and the civic virtues (see *Politics* III.4, 1276b34-35). *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* form a seamless whole: the state is composed of citizens who employ moral reasoning (Pol. III.1, 1274b39-1275a1). In contrast with Plato, Aristotle's forms of government have no preset order of quality. The number of the rulers as well as the *telos* of the state's political action (regarding whether the state is directed at securing welfare of its citizens or only of its rulers,) determine the form of government (NE I.13, 1102a5-10, see also I.7, 1097a15-1098b9). Monarchy, aristocracy and polity are the better options according to Aristotle (Pol. IV.9-11).

The Stageirite does not leave the role of virtue in government without notice: as exempt from other classes in society, Aristotle's ruler is expected to be in control of both his civic virtues and his character virtues. The ruler must thus in order to be a good statesman, be also a good person (NE I.4, 1095b4-7). Only then it is possible that the form of government, active in his state is not one of the corrupted regimes. Aristotle writes that "the goodness of the good man, and that of the citizen of the best city, must be one and the same" (Pol. III.18, 1288a32-39). The virtues of the ruler have an effect on the political level for both Plato and Aristotle. In the case of the former the character of the ruler determines the entire form of the government, while in the case of the latter, certain requirements are placed for the ruler of the better forms of government (see Pol. VII.4, 27-38).

Key words: Plato, Aristotle, character, virtue, state, ethics, politics

¹ This paper is an extended English translation of a paper presented at the annual Philosophical Society of Finland colloquium 2014 centered on the topic of "virtue". The Finnish language conference paper was published in *Hyve*, Hämäläinen, Lemetti & Niiniluoto (eds.) 2014.

Paper

Introduction

Character virtues have an important role in moral and political philosophy of the ancient Greek thought. They direct how we act, what are our habits and how our acts are guided at goals both on personal as well as the communal level. In the theories of Plato and Aristotle the relationship between the virtues of subjects as well as the rulers are related to the state. The theory of the ideal state presented in Plato's *Republic*² has received a lot of criticism due to events of the last century, and it is clear that the utopia described in that work is not meant to be taken as a serious blueprint for an actual society. Still *Republic* is historically relevant because of its position as the origin of political philosophy. Within the book structures representing virtues of the individual repeat on the political level. Especially the status of the ruler is interesting in this sense: the types of government ruled by an individual – monarchy and tyranny – are at the opposite ends of Plato's hierarchy of forms of government. The ruler in the case of the former is just and faultless in terms of character, whereas the latter describes a ruler, who is bereft of even the slightest notion of self-control. In these cases, it follows, that the character of a single person can determine the course of action of an entire state.

Plato is criticized by his pupil, Aristotle throughout the work of the latter (see esp. Pol. II). Maybe for this reason Aristotle's political theory, which is presented consecutively³ in *Nicomachean Ethics*⁴ and *Politics*⁵, includes a more complex theory of virtues, state and the interaction between them. In Aristotle, the connection between the state and the character of its ruler is not as clear as it is in the case of Plato: in the case of the former philosopher, instead of an idea of the ideal state, human nature takes precedence and the way, in which the political machinery is organized around it (in the best case) helping its citizens to achieve *eudaimonia* – happiness, flourishing or ultimately the good life.

² Plato's *Republic* Plato. Original research based on the Finnish translation by Marja Itkonen-Kaila, 2007. English version used: Plato: The Collected Dialogues. Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. © 1961 Bollingen Foundation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

³ The state is in Aristotle's theory a whole consisting of a group of citizens, who employ moral deliberation (see Pol. III.1, 1274b39-1275a1, see also Sihvola's commentary in the Finnish translation (1991), p 221-222).

⁴ Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Original research based on the Finnish translation by Simo Knuuttila (2005, 2nd ed.). English version used: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. 1984. Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. © 1984 The Jowett Copyright Trustees. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁵ Aristotle *Politics*. Original research based on the Finnish translation by A. M. Anttila with explanations by Juha Sihvola (1991). English version used: *Politics*. Translated by Ernest Barker, revised by R. F. Stalley. 1998 Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In this paper Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions are examined together on how the character virtues of the rulers have an effect on the formation of distinct forms of government in the state (*polis*). As the comparison is done on a very general level, sufficient detail is not achieved in every respect. Despite of these short-comings, it is claimed here that Plato's *Republic*, which is examined first, can be said to contain a definite connection between the character of the ruler and the state he or she governs. The following claim is that in comparison, the political theory of Aristotle contains rather a criticism of that connection, however it is noted that Aristotle himself does present certain demands toward the character of the statesman, based on which the state could function in the best possible way.

Plato's *Republic*

Interaction between the virtues and the state is discussed in Plato's *Republic* explicitly. The virtues discussed within this work refer to the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance (or rationality). These three are the primary virtues, which Plato compares with the fourth cardinal virtue of justice, which finally appears as a balance of the other three virtues. Determining what justice exactly is, is at the core of the discussion committed in the *Republic* (III, 415-417). The description of the state and the forms of government is done by making connections between them and the human character. On the level of the state the tri-partite division is repeated as the three main classes are guardians, soldiers and producers (see 370-375): where an individual can have a certain amount of virtues; can the state consist respectively of different compositions of varyingly functioning social classes. E.g. the more courageous the soldiers the state has, the more successful the state is in its military efforts. Justice, on the other hand, is realized on the level of the state in the way that the offices are appropriately held by suitable citizens in practice: in a society, where the wisest are employed as the guardians, the most courageous as the soldiers and the most reasonable as the producers, is the one where justice is realized the best. (435b.)

According to Plato, when justice is the defining virtue of the ruler, is the form of the government either a monarchy or an aristocracy depending on the number of the rulers. The process of acquiring this virtue has, in addition to achieving mastery of every other virtue, requires philosophical studies⁶ and practice of philosophical skills from the ruler. For this reason Plato famously speaks of the state

⁶ Philosophy included every known branch of science in ancient Greece.

governed by a “philosopher-king”.⁷ In the case of the ruler, his or her action is governed by both just and unjust traits of character, and thus the form of government is most likely to be influenced by the result of this inner conflict. The rule of the “philosopher-king” or aristocracy is Plato’s ideal state, from which the other forms of government degenerate (see 546d-547c & 572c-573c). After Plato has clarified what justice means for the ruler of his ideal state, and that how justice manifests in said state (445c), he resumes the discussion about the other forms of government from book VIII onwards.⁸

Other forms of government are imperfect, when compared with the ideal state, and the main reason for the failure to reach that status is due to failure in character education (see 497ab). In his discussion Plato initially describes the character of the ruler of his ideal state: First selected to the guardian class through training in arts and military skills, any one of the guardians can eventually accede to the position of the “philosopher-king” (see 473d & 484a – 487e). For differing reasons, the succeeding generations might not pursue excellences in philosophical pursuits. In these cases the dominant character trait of the ruler will be ambition and foolhardiness due to the aforementioned military training (545a, 548a-550b). For the reason that the character of the ruler leaves its mark on the society through its legislation, and the valuation of corresponding character traits is reflected by the new laws (338e-339e). Plato compares these *timocracies*⁹, or governments based on valuation of honor to the real city states of Crete and Sparta (544c). Timocracy gains some support from Plato, but as its counterparts, he describes three other forms of government, each worse than the next. In the third form of government the sense of honor has been forgotten by the rulers, and only sentiment that remains is avarice. The type of government focused on amassing wealth is called *oligarchy* by Plato (550d-e).

The form of government described next by Plato, deviates clearly from the previous ones by nature and by the way how it is initially conceived. Fed up with being governed by sheer greed, the public grows tired of its immodest rulers and takes power for itself. The following situation is controversial: on one hand, this form of government that Plato calls democracy, is typified by the greatest amount of freedom, and is thus the requirement for the greatest feats of creativity (562c). On the other hand, thinks Plato that the public is unfit to govern itself: unnecessary and corrupt

⁷ Speaking of the *Republic* it is good to remember that Plato – through the voice of Socrates – presents his theoretical, ideal state. Therefore the form of government, which is sketched throughout the book, has not had a counterpart in history. (See. 369b-372d, see also Tenkku’s commentary p. 399.)

⁸ Book IV of the *Republic* ends with an allusion to this run-down of the imperfect forms of governments, but the topic is interrupted within the dialogue. Book VIII continues with the discussion about the inferior forms of government.

⁹ Plato uses *timarchy* as synonym to *timocracy* (545b).

urges define the behavior of the lazy and self-serving ruler (561a-d). As long as the necessities of life are fulfilled in a democracy, can that sort of government exist. However, Plato thinks that the application of force that the citizens direct at themselves, drive eventually the society into chaos and thus peace falls apart.¹⁰ From the ashes of the fallen democracy rises a charismatic individual, who nevertheless is completely unfit to govern a state. The leader of tyranny acts entirely based on his appetitive part of the soul¹¹ by acting completely erratically (571bd-574a).

The forms of government thus degenerate in a linear order, from better to worse as follows: aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny (see 445d). This process mimics the concurrent dismantlement of strongest character traits held by the ruling families from general state of reigning justice to a situation, where the original character of the tyrant or his way of life has driven him to be person who is a drunk, uncouth and mad (573c). In Plato's state, thus, the rulers soul and the character virtues within it are directly connected with the state he or she governs (see 435e). If the form of the government changing from one to another is related to the temperament of its ruler, it can be claimed that that which form of government is at stake in context of Plato's theory, is the result of dominant character virtues held by the ruler or rulers. In the spirit of Plato's theory of ideas, the interaction between the character virtues and forms of government could be described by using the analogy of the divided line: the character of the ruler functions as the "seed" of his or her actualized action (see 509d-511e)¹². Respectively the form of government that is determined on the basis of the character of the ruler directs the actualizing action of the state. In this way the character virtues of an individual can be "projected" throughout the quotidian policy of an entire state.

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*

Plato's pupil, Aristotle, could have asked his teacher, whether it really was true that any oligarchy would be better than any democracy only on the grounds that the democratic ruler is lazy and self-serving by definition? Aristotle's critique on Plato's philosophy, presented in *Politics*, is centered

¹⁰ Plato's mistrust toward democracy was certainly influenced by the historical context, such as the end result of the Peloponnesian war and the democratically ordered execution of his teacher, Socrates. (See C.D.C. Reeve 2003 "Plato, *Republic* (ca. 380bc): The Psycho-politics of Justice", 20.)

¹¹ According the tri-partite division of the soul made by Plato, human beings are driven by three parts of the soul simultaneously. These are the logical, spirited and the appetitive. These have also a direct connection the three cardinal virtues: Wisdom is the virtue of the logical part, courage of the spirited part and temperance of the appetitive part of the soul.

¹² See Tenkku's commentary in the Finnish translation (2007) p. 415.

around the idea that the attainment of the good life is dependent on human nature and that helping to realize this goal the ideal *telos* of all forms of government.¹³

In this section Aristotle's character virtues and civic virtues are examined first, and after that Aristotle's forms of government are briefly listed. Finally that is described, how the ruler's character has an effect on the determination of the form of government within the state he or she is governing. Virtues of character originate from habits (*ēthikē*). The character virtues (incl. courage, friendliness, temperance etc.) direct action. Through habituation and education, the mimetically learned practices become stable, i.e. a person attains a virtue by practice. They are not necessarily permanent, as the person can through practice affect his or her virtues. Each virtue is accompanied by two corresponding vices, the first of which is lack of said virtue, whereas the second is excess of that virtue. E.g. lack of courage means cowardice and excess of courage means foolhardiness. The "golden mean" between the two vices is viewed by Aristotle as the ideal state in case of most of the virtues.¹⁴ (NE II.1, 1103a15-21.)

The aggregation of character virtues accompanied with the vices direct the action of the person. For example a sort of character, who were proficient in the virtue of courage, could run into a burning building and save a pet trapped inside, whereas a person who would be lack that virtue would not. The deepest nature of human action according to Aristotle is the ability to commit to choices, while informed of the alternative courses of action. He calls this process of making informed choices *prohairesis*.¹⁵ Equipped with suited virtues and right reason (*orthos logos*), person's action following informed choices is directed at the correct ends (NE VI.2).¹⁶ Practical reason (*phronēsis*) belongs to the group of intellectual virtues. It refers to correct choices made, meaning the selection of courses of action that are in accordance with the golden mean. When a person, who is well equipped with practical reason, is confronted with a situation requiring moral choice, is this individual able to select the course of action through deliberation, which leads to the best possible outcome. In the cases, in which this person happens to be a ruler of a state, the goal of his or her action is not only his or her own well-being, but that of the entire community. To rephrase, virtuous behavior according to practical reason means making choices in accordance with the golden mean

¹³ Aristotle's argument against Plato's ban of private property is based on empirical comparison between contemporary states as well as traditions upheld in ancient Greece (Evangelidou 1995, 52).

¹⁴ As Plato did also, Aristotle holds justice in special regard: this virtue does not have a vice associated with what would amount to "excessive justice".

¹⁵ In *Aristotle on Moral Responsibility* (2011) Susan S. Meyer writes that *prohairesis* is essential in accordance with the pursuit of good life (See Meyer 2011, 26).

¹⁶ See Simo Knuuttila's explanations, which describe Aristotle's moral psychological

in action, i.e. a virtuous ruler would make the best choices required by the political situation. (NE I.2. 1098a16-17.)

In addition to character virtues and practical reason virtues of the citizen are distinguished as their own group in Aristotle's theory (Pol. III.4 1276b16 – 1277a4). They are described to be such that when mastered, the citizen can do the task of his or her class without difficulty: farmers are able to farm, craftsmen are able to craft, builders are able to build and soldiers succeed in their campaigns.¹⁷ Aristotle expects more from the rulers than he does from the other classes: First of all, they are supposed to know the position of the subjects. Second, whereas the subjects are not necessarily expected to act according to practical reason,¹⁸ good governance demands *phronēsis* from its executives.¹⁹ (See Pol. III.4 1277a12-24). Finally, the ruler is expected to have suitable character virtues fitting the task. In order to be a good ruler, he or she has to be a good person as well (NE I.4 1095b4-7). Only then is it possible, that the form of the government the ruler is in charge of is not a corrupted one.²⁰

Because the aggregate political action of the citizens form the political action of the state, is the state best equipped to provide good life to its citizens, when the citizens direct their action to be in accordance with the ends of the state. (See NE I.7, 1097a15 – 1098b9 & 1102a5 – 10.) Similarly as in the case of a virtuous individual, the action of the state, correctly organized is directed at its ideal goal. When a statesman – with proper upbringing and exercise of the virtues – is able to commit the right choices, can he or she direct the political action of his or her state toward its ideal mode, one advancing good life.²¹ This state-wide well-being – happiness or flourishing (*eudaimonia*) – is the highest goal of Aristotle's political theory (NE I.7). Keeping in mind the goal of *eudaimonia* and the character-directed ability to make decisions of the person who is responsible its attainment, it can be understood, why Aristotle demanded from the ruler the requirements of upbringing and education as well as suited character traits in addition to technical or *poiesis*-type mastery of his or

¹⁷ A more in-depth description of the classes in society is found in book VI of the *Politics*. (Pol. VI.7, 1321a 5-9.)

¹⁸ Even if this seems to be the case in *Politics*, it is stated by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*, that it is not possible to be virtuous without practical reason (NE VI.13 1144b20-21; see also Halper 1995, 80).

¹⁹ Practical reason is an intellectual virtue, which can only be achieved through external habituation and education. A broader account of the virtue can be found e.g. from Sarah Broadie's *Ethics with Aristotle*, chapter four, which is titled "Practical Wisdom" (1991, 179-265).

²⁰ In the previous article by the author "Teot, luonne ja kansalaisuus – Nykyfilosofian tulkintoja Aristoteleen vastuukäsityksestä" (2011, Historiallinen aikakauskirja 02/11) it was concluded that there are connections between virtuous and vicious rulers and forms of governments that were organized in different ways.

²¹ Good life in a state is described in *Politics* IV.11 (1295a36-39).

her profession. Life in accordance with moral action is simultaneously political action as well (See NE X.9).

The final example of Plato-criticism done by Aristotle mentioned here is that in contrast to the theory of the former, quantity of rulers does not have an effect on the quality of the state in the theory of the latter. I.e. a state being governed by its people does not automatically mean that it would be corrupted, or that a state governed by a single individual would be extremely good or bad. According to Aristotle, if there happen to be a lot of rulers, it does not indicate that the government would function better or worse than in cases, where there is only one (see Pol. IV.2 1289b 5-12). Additionally as distinct from Plato's linear series of worse and worse governments, Aristotle's forms of government do not have a preset order of change.²² An aristocracy can become a tyranny, or an oligarchy can form into a *polity* etc. Instead of this, the political *telos* of the state,²³ and that whether the state helps its citizens or only its rulers in achieving *eudaimonia*, decide the quality of the government. Monarchy, aristocracy and especially *polity* are the better options, where the state serves its citizens. The mean between oligarchy and democracy called *polity* is closest to an ideal state in Aristotle's theory. In it the benefits of the state would equally benefit the rich and the poor (Pol. IV.11).²⁴ Tyranny, oligarchy and democracy are the defacements of the previous three types of government, in which the benefit of the ruler(s) takes priority (Po. IV.2 1289a26-30 & IV.9-11).²⁵ When the beneficial end-state of the *polis* is being pursued, the actions of its citizens are directed toward the common good, which means also that the character traits of the citizens' are impeccable.²⁶ As for the ruler this means that to be able to govern successfully, he or she has to have a balanced set of virtues as part of a groomed character.²⁷ Acting accordingly, the behavior of the ruler manifests as actuality (*energeia*), which is its own end. *Telos* determines the form of government (Pol. I 1253a23, III.4.1276b27-29), but as noted before the ruler can via practice e affect that, whether the most beneficial end is also the end of the state, which he or she governs.

If the form of government's determination according to the natural end of the state and the changing of forms of government through direct influence of the virtues of the ruler seem to contradict each other, is a likely explanation to this found from the principle of teleology, which is occasionally

²² The changing of the forms of government is discussed in *Citizens and Statesmen* (1992, p. 112) by Mary P. Nichols.

²³ In Aristotle's theory the state is part of the nature, meaning that it also has a *teleological* end (Pol. I.2 1253a25).

²⁴ See also Halper 1995, 87.

²⁵ Each state has its optimal size in Aristotle's theory. Other forms of government are suited best to serve the needs of small states, while others can accommodate to a large population.

²⁶ Aristotle writes that the virtues of a good man and the virtues of the citizen of the best state are the same. (Pol. III 18, 1288a32-39; see also Kamtekar 2014.)

²⁷ Edward C. Halper writes about this in his presentation "Virtue and the State" (1995, 85).

followed in Aristotle's political theory.²⁸ Just in *Politics* his argumentation is based on the assumed truth of the principle in the three first books of the treatise, while in books IV, V and VI are more grounded on the effective cause (implying causality) on the state. The remaining books from book VII forward are again preoccupied with the principle of teleology. As result, there are two interpretations of how the virtues of character have an effect on the political level.²⁹

If the determination of the form of government is looked at as part of nature, in the teleological context, the process of the determination appears as follows: (1.) the *telos* of the state is either eudaimonic or not. (2.) The quantity of the rulers is either a group, a family or a single individual. (3.) Depending on the two previous variables the form of government is either beneficial (polity, aristocracy or monarchy) or corrupted (democracy, oligarchy or tyranny). (4.) The type of the government reveals, whether the ruler or rulers have or lack the necessary traits of character that are required for successful governance.

On the other hand, if it is assumed that along with *Politics* IV-VI, that the rulers practice actively their virtues and are able in this way to decisively bring about a change in the form of government, for example through a revolution, is the form of government determined in this way: (1.) That, whether the ruler has all the required character traits to run a beneficial government, (2.) determines which end is the state pursuing: the well-being of all its citizens or of its rulers only. (3.) The chosen end of action determines that, whether the resulting form of government is beneficial or corrupted. (4.) This end and the quantity of the rulers reveal the final form of the government.

Summary

Character virtues held by the ruler(s) have an effect on the political level in both Plato's and Aristotle's cases. In the former case the character of the ruler determines the form of government directly, whereas in the latter case – depending on the weight given to the principle of teleology – either the impact of the character traits of the ruler are held decisive, or certain requirements are placed on the rulers of states that strive for *telos* associated with the better forms of government (see *Pol.* VII 4, 1325b37—38).

²⁸ Juha Sihvola explains book III.4 (*Pol.* 1991, 253-254) with Aristotle's problematic definition of political life. According to Sihvola, Aristotle's political life is given scope that is too broad: the demand that a citizen skilled in terms of his or hers civic virtues should also be a good person is hard to accept.

²⁹ See Nichols 1992, 87.

Even if the details of Aristotle's political philosophy could not be brought in to today's politics without problems (as was the case with Plato), his general message can still be understood: The state is the sum of its citizens. The better the people are at practice of their virtues, the more functional the state is. Especially this concerns the ruler: notwithstanding the possible, direct effect that the ruler's character does or does not have on the form of government, the best of the governments demand full mastery of the citizen's virtues from its rulers. These include the practical skills of statesmen as well an in-depth knowledge of the position of the subjects. In other words, if the ruler does not understand the connection between the decisions she makes and the everyday life of the citizen, she has lost perception of the true *telos* of the state: securing good life for everyone.

University of Helsinki

Bibliography

Classics

Aristotle (2005), *Aristoteles VII: Nikomakhoksen etiikka* Gaudeamus, Tampere. 2nd ed. Translated and commented by Simo Knuuttila.

Aristotle (1991), *Aristoteles VIII: Poliitikka* Gaudeamus, Jyväskylä. 2nd ed. Translated by A. M. Anttila. Comments by Juha Sihvola.

Plato (2007), *Valtio*, Otava, Keuruu. 2nd ed. Translated by Marja Itkonen-Kaila.

Commentaries

Broadie, Sarah (1991), *Ethics with Aristotle*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Halper, Edward C. (1995), "Virtue and the State" in the book *Aristotelian Political Philosophy – Athens 1995 Vol. 1*. Ed. Konstantin Boudouris. International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture & K.B.

Evangelidou, Christos (1995), "Aristotle's Critique of Plato's Republic" in the book *Aristotelian Political Philosophy – Athens 1995 Vol. 2*. Ed. Konstantin Boudouris. International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture & K.B.

Kaila, Eero (2011), "Teot, luonne ja kansalaisuus – Nykyfilosofian tulkintoja Aristoteleen vastuukäsityksestä", *Historiallinen aikakauskirja* 02/11, 171-179.

Meyer, Susan Sauvé (2011) *Aristotle on Moral Responsibility – Character and Cause*, 2nd ed.

Nichols, Mary P. (1992), *Citizens and Statesmen*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. New York.

Reeve C.D.C. (2003), "Plato, *Republic* (ca. 380 bc): The Psycho-politics of Justice", in the book *The Classics of Western Philosophy A Reader's Guide*, ed. Gracia, Reichberg & Schumacher, Blackwell Publishing, Padstow, Cornwall.